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in short
The author offers a personal reflection on some developments in the approach to methodology in the study of religion at The 
University of Queensland over the past twenty-five years. In the process, he covers issues such as methodological atheism 
versus methodological agnosticism, the relationship between faith and reason, and mutual critical correlation. 
What is offered here is a personal reflection on some of the movements in the approach to method in the study of religion here at The University of Queensland over the past twenty-five years. I 
have used the outsider/insider theme to organize the material. In relation to the insider issue, the focus 
is generally on Christian theology because that is my particular research area. However, I recognise of 
course that much the same issues apply in relation to Jewish and Islamic theology, as well as to disci-
plines such as Buddhist and other Asian philosophies, and to the spiritual principles associated with 
various new religious movements. 
 The question of the relationship between studies in religion and theology is an important one on 
the world scene. There are some religious studies departments that eschew theology completely. Others 
are inclusive, adopting titles such as the “Department of Religious Studies and Theology.” There is also 
a Canadian journal entitled Religious Studies and Theology. The relationship between the two academic 
approaches to religion has featured at certain points in the history of UQ’s Department (now discipline) 
of Studies in Religion. 
 I remember very clearly the kinds of debates that were prominent in what was then the Depart-
ment of Studies in Religion in the mid to late 1980s. I had arrived on the scene as a Bachelor of Theology 
student at the Brisbane College of Theology also enrolled in the BA (Hons) programme. Methodological 
issues were very prominent in the Studies in Religion offerings. Richard Hutch taught a mandatory 
second level course on methods, and there was an honours seminar devoted to the topic. The strong 
emphasis on methodology was due in part to historical factors. The Department was established in 1975 
with three clergymen as the lecturing team: Rev. Eric Pyle, Rev. Dr. Ian Gillman, and Rev. Dr. Peter Carn-
ley. In the early 1980s the Brisbane College of Theology was launched. This meant that quite a bit of the 
student ‘market’ was lost to the new competitor. This was one factor that led the staff in the department 
to head in the direction of a fully-fledged programme of academic study of religion and the religions. In 
line with this, there was a focus on distinguishing this approach from that of theology. 
 In the honours seminar on methodology, we were required to read articles by Donald Wiebe1 and 
Ninian Smart.2 Wiebe argues that the only legitimate methodological stance for the scholar of religion 
is an atheistic one. He is enthusiastic in his support of Robert Segal in his attack on the approach of 
scholars such as Mircea Eliade who, it is claimed, work with an ‘uncritical assumption of the existence 
… of the transcendent referents of religious discourse (belief) and symbolic import of ritual and moral 
behaviours.’3 Wiebe also opines that the ‘crypto-theology agenda’ that operates in some religious studies 
departments constitutes a ‘failure of nerve.’4 
 Smart, on the other hand, contends that methodological agnosticism is the appropriate approach. 
He avers that the scholar of religion ‘should treat the objects of religious experience and beliefs as factors 
independently of whether they exist/are true.’5 On this view, it is not necessary to decide whether 
Allah actually revealed truth to Muhammad to observe that Muhammad’s inner conviction that this 
took place resulted in a movement that has changed the course of human history. I remember at the 
time being strongly convinced of the logic associated with this position and arguing quite passionately 
for it in the seminar. I also remember being somewhat disconcerted by Wiebe’s exclusivist approach. 
He contends for an exclusively outsider approach, arguing that the introduction of theology into the 
domain of study of religion has ‘infected’ it. This was rather confronting for someone who at the time 
was also training as a theologian and planning to work in the psychology and theology dialogue area in 
his honours research.
 An outsider can take her pick in relation to methodological agnosticism or atheism. An insider, 
however, needs to contend with the issue of the relationship between faith and reason.6 The English 
mathematician W. K. Clifford (1845–1879) contended that ‘[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’7 He goes on to say that:
If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes 
away any doubts which arise about it in his mind … and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily 
be asked without disturbing it—the life of that man is one long sin against mankind …8
If Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) had lived after Clifford, he would have felt very confident about meeting 
the challenge thrown down by the mathematician. According to Aquinas, there are two categories for 
truths about the divine. First, there are truths that it is possible to demonstrate by human reason, and 
second there are truths that cannot be known by reason alone. Included in the first category, we find 
truths such as God exists, God is good, and God created the world. Aquinas believed that his ‘Five Ways’ 
provide a convincing case for the claim that God exists. He can be classified as a strong rationalist.9
 At the other end of the spectrum we find fideism. The fideist contends that it is legitimate to 
hold a religious belief simply on the basis of faith assumptions alone. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) is 
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scornful of the approach to religion that examines its truth claims through objective, detached analysis 
of evidence.10 Objective, rational inquiry into religion is always an ‘approximation process.’ One moves 
closer and closer to the truth but can never quite get there; there is always one more piece of evidence to 
evaluate. What is required is the courage to take a ‘leap of faith.’
 The contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga sums up the fideistic approach this way: ‘[I]t is 
entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at 
all.’11 Clearly, he is contending against Clifford’s view that a belief is rationally justified only if there 
is sufficient evidence for it. Plantinga begins his argument with the observation that we believe some 
things without being able to prove them. These are called our basic beliefs. Everything that we claim to 
know is built on the foundation of our basic beliefs. One example of these beliefs is associated with 
sense perception. I hold up my hand in front of me and I know that it is my hand that I am looking at 
and not someone else’s. I don’t need any evidence for this. Another basic belief has to do with memory. 
For example, ‘I had breakfast this morning.’ I know that I had some Weeties at around seven o’clock this 
morning. It is not something that I need to prove. Plantinga argues that there are also basic beliefs that 
theists work with. By definition, these beliefs do not require evidence or proof. Examples are as follows: 
(1) God is speaking to me. (2) God has created all this. (3) God disapproves of what I have done. (4) God 
forgives me. (5) God is to be thanked and praised.
 Most theologians would describe themselves as critical rationalists. They are uncomfortable with 
both strong rationalism and fideism. Over against the fideist, the critically rational theologian contends 
that it is possible to rationally critique and evaluate one’s own religious tradition. Indeed, this is seen as 
a vitally important role for theology. Critical analysis has the power to purify a tradition of its destruc-
tive and unhealthy elements. In contrast to the strong rationalist, the critically rational theologian rejects 
the notion that reason has the power to provide conclusive, universally convincing proof that one’s 
religious system is true.
 To return to my experience in the honours seminar of 1987, I also have a vivid memory of Philip 
Almond and Richard Hutch offering two quite different approaches to research on religion and the 
religions. Philip discussed Smart’s approach and emphasised the role of critical reason, whereas Richard 
used the work of Sigmund Freud to challenge what he saw as an over-emphasis on rationality. I still 
remember his punchline: ‘Freud’s work on unconscious drives serves to remind us that we are not quite 
as rational as we like to think that we are.’ Richard also discussed the approach of some insiders who 
see their intellectual research on religion as a devotional exercise. Philip identified what he saw as the 
problems with such an approach. In response, one of the students put this question to Philip: ‘Doesn’t 
the fact that you don’t have faith mean that your understanding of the Christian tradition that you 
teach about is necessarily limited?’ His reply was that the only thing he is unable to understand is what 
it is like to have faith. Clearly this is right. Outsiders in the academic study of religion understand the 
history, sacred texts, ethics, theology, philosophy, etc., of a religious tradition much, much better than 
the vast majority of the adherents. 
 Given that in my honours days Philip Almond was strong on maintaining the distinction between 
the academic study of religion and theology, I was a little surprised when in 2004 in his new role as Head 
of the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics he asked me, in my new role as lecturer in 
Studies in Religion, to do some work on introducing a doctorate in the practical theology area. One 
of the recommendations from the review of the school that took place in that year was that such a 
programme should be offered. In 2006 the programme began with twelve candidates enrolled.  
 Disciplines that are relatively new, or that are at a critical point in their development, often become 
heavily-focused on methodological issues. I happen to be involved with two disciplines that have been 
10.  Fideism comes through in the views expressed by ‘Johannes Climacus,’ a pseudonym who is the ostensible author of certain 
books by Kierkegaard. It is difficult to know to what extent Kierkegaard embraces some of the views presented.  
11.  A. Plantinga, “Reason and Religious Belief,” in Faith and Rationality, ed. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 17.
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in this situation. Those associated with studies in religion in the 1970s and 1980s devoted so much time 
and energy to issues of method partly because of a felt need to draw a line between it and theology. 
Practical theologians were similarly preoccupied in the same period. The reason was obviously different 
in their case. Leading thinkers such as Don Browning at the University of Chicago, Elaine Graham at 
the University of Manchester, Duncan Forrester at the University of Edinburgh, and Gerben Heitink 
at the Free University of Amsterdam worked hard to establish practical theology as a discipline that 
rightly belongs in the academy. In order to do this, they needed to develop a rigorous methodology. 
The method that is commonly used is called ‘mutual critical correlation.’ Inspiration was drawn from 
the work of the philosophical theologian David Tracy. He argues that theologians need to engage in 
mutual critical correlation between religious perspectives and cultural sources (philosophy, psychology, 
anthropology, etc.).12 Tracy’s approach represents a revision of Paul Tillich’s correlational method. In his 
philosophical theology, Tillich aimed to correlate Christian perspectives with the cultural situation.13 
Tracy shows, however, that Tillich’s method does not actually call for a correlation between results from 
investigations of both cultural interpretations and religious values. Instead, it asks for a correlation of 
questions generated by cultural analyses with answers provided in the Christian message. If the cultural 
expressions are taken seriously, their answers to their own questions will be analysed critically. A critical 
approach must compare the religious answers with those from all other relevant sources. Tracy helpfully 
points out that what is needed is a method capable of correlating the questions and answers from both 
sources. The questions and answers provided by a reinterpreted religious consciousness need to be 
critically correlated with the questions and answers contained in a reinterpreted cultural consciousness. 
This is the methodological approach that is commonly adopted by practical theologians.
 There have always been both outsider and insider approaches in Studies in Religion at UQ. The 
research line-up today looks like this. As has already been indicated, I work in the practical theology 
area. My major areas of interest are pastoral care, and theology and health care. I mainly use the critical 
correlational method, but have also done some empirical research. Rick Strelan focuses his research on 
the cultural world of the first Christians with attention given primarily to the literary sources, especially 
the New Testament. His approach is socio-historical, as his research deliberately draws attention to 
those cultural aspects which might be considered strange to the modern Westerner. Richard Hutch 
is still with us. His approach is best described as the phenomenology of religion, processed through 
the social sciences. For the most part, he eschews postmodern considerations. Richard’s monographs 
explore the interface between religious experience in the life of the individual and its personal, social 
and cultural expressions in contemporary world history. Phil Almond has moved into UQ’s Centre 
for the History of European Discourses. His current research interests include apocalypticism in early 
modern England and demonic possession, exorcism, and witchcraft in early modern England. He has 
particular interests in themes in religious cultural history in the early modern period. Sylvie Shaw’s 
focus is on the interconnection between people, the environment and spirituality. She uses a qualitative 
methodology. Sylvie is currently completing a study on the impact of fisheries decline on fishers and 
their families in three Queensland regions. Her next project examines the values held in the community 
about south-east Queensland’s waterways. Roxanne Marcotte engages in research on Islamic Studies, 
modern and classical Islamic thought, medieval Islamic philosophy (Arabic and Persian), and women 
in Islam. Most of her work is textual study. Last but not least, Adam Bowles is a scholar of Sanskrit 
literature and South Asian history and religion. His current research falls into two broad categories: 
studies of and translations from the great Sanskrit epic the Mahabharata, and aspects of governance and 
religion in the eighteenth century.
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